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abstract
The fact that nominal interest rates cannot be negative implies that alternative policies 
must be considered at the zero bound to provide stimulus, should it be needed. This 
note is an assessment of ﬁ  scal policies at the zero bound. Using a model for the euro 
area, we illustrate and quantify the effects of ﬁ  scal policy responses to a major recession 
that leads the economy to the zero lower bound on interest rates. First, we show that 
ad-hoc ﬁ  scal policy measures lead to results that are very different from the efﬁ  cient 
allocation. Then, drawing on the results in Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2011), we 
show how ﬁ  scal policy should be designed to replicate the efﬁ  cient allocation.
1. Introduction
Nominal interest rates cannot be negative. If they could, people would make arbitrarily large proﬁ  ts just 
by borrowing and holding money. So when the policy rate is very close to zero, as has been the case in 
the last three years in the US and other economies, nominal interest rates cannot be further reduced. 
If further stimulus is necessary, alternative policies must be considered. This note is an assessment of 
ﬁ  scal policies at the zero bound. It draws heavily on work by Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2011).
If prices and wages were ﬂ  exible, the fact that interest rates cannot be negative would be irrelevant for 
policy. In most models, the zero bound would actually be the optimal policy, the Friedman rule, named 
after Milton Friedman who ﬁ  rst derived it. The argument of Friedman is straightforward. The nominal 
interest rate, the return on riskless short-term nominal debt, is the opportunity cost of holding money. 
It is the price of money. Given that the cost of producing money is, if not zero, very close to it, a simple 
efﬁ  ciency argument would equate the price of money to its marginal cost, i.e. zero. The nominal interest 
rate should therefore be zero or very close to it. With ﬂ  exible prices and wages, a zero nominal interest 
rate does not restrict real interest rates, or real allocations. The real interest rate is the nominal rate minus 
inﬂ  ation, and if inﬂ  ation is not costly, it is always possible to achieve a target for the real rate, at zero 
cost, through a particular target for the inﬂ  ation rate. If the real interest rate ought to be negative, say 
minus 4 per cent per year, this can be done at the zero bound with 4 per cent inﬂ  ation per year.
Most economists would agree that the swings in inﬂ  ation rates that would be necessary to achieve good 
outcomes at the Friedman rule would be hard to implement and, if possible, would come at a cost. They 
would require synchronized movements in all prices in the economy that, because of information costs 
or more direct menu costs, would be hard to achieve. The movements in inﬂ  ation rates would also have 
to be credible, meaning that future policy would have to conﬁ  rm them. But most mandates of central 
banks in the developed world include objectives of price stability, and inﬂ  ation swings of that order of 
magnitude would not comply with those mandates.
*  The opinions expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of 
Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.










sAt the end of 2008, in response to the major events in ﬁ  nancial markets in the US and elsewhere, policy 
rates were lowered to the historically low levels of 0 to 25 basis points in the US. If possible, nominal 
interest rates would have been further reduced. But they could not be. What are, then, alternative policies?
An obvious candidate is government spending. In Portugal, total government expenditure as a share of 
GDP was raised from 43.7 per cent in 2007 to 48.1 per cent in 2009. The case of Portugal is striking given 
the very high levels of public and foreign debt, and the recent history of low GDP growth rates,1 but this 
was a common pattern across the world. Still, the evidence on the effects of government spending is 
controversial, at most. And it is particularly scarce at the zero bound. Models can be used to assess the 
effects of policy at the zero bound, even if they are not as reliable as one would wish because some of 
the assumptions, as the ones on price and wage stickiness, are not policy invariant.
There is theoretical and quantitative work on the effects of government consumption on economic 
activity at the zero bound, as in Eggertsson (2009), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004a, 2004b) 
or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009).2 They show that the fact that interest rates cannot be 
reduced is responsible for a much higher multiplier of government spending. Christiano, Eichenbaum 
and Rebelo (2009), in particular, show that the multiplier on government spending is larger; the larger 
is the need to use it. In these models there would be no effect on output if government spending was 
a substitute for private consumption. In fact, the effect on output is larger when government consump-
tion is useless. The analysis is about effects of government consumption on economic activity, not about 
effects of this on welfare. The effects on welfare, if positive, are much lower.
Correia et al. (2011) show that taxes can be used to achieve efﬁ  cient outcomes. The intuition is simple. 
Suppose that for some reason, possibly associated with increased uncertainty, agents wanted to save 
more. If the nominal interest rate was way above the zero bound, then it could be lowered, and, for a 
stable inﬂ  ation rate, the resulting low real rates would reduce the incentives to save, preventing consump-
tion, and production, from decreasing. But if the necessary cut on nominal interest rates was very large, 
then the economy would hit the zero bound. How can real rates be lowered at the zero bound? High 
expected inﬂ  ation would bring real interest rates down. But high inﬂ  ation is hard to implement, because 
of the need to raise prices of all goods and because it may be hard to convince the public that the central 
bank would allow for high inﬂ  ation in the future, even if temporary.
Consider now a policy in which consumption taxes are lowered today to be raised in the future. An 
expected increase in consumption taxes is future inﬂ  ation. But it has two advantages relative to inﬂ  ation 
in producer prices. Consumption taxes move all prices together keeping producer prices unchanged and, 
furthermore, it can be credible.
The combination of low consumption taxes today with high consumption taxes in the future can distort 
the allocation of labour. But there are ways of correcting this. Labour income taxes must be adjusted to 
compensate for the changes in consumption taxes. Variable consumption taxes also distort the allocation 
of capital. If they are low today and high tomorrow, capital accumulation becomes relatively expensive 
and so capital income taxes would have to be lowered to remove that distortion. Finally, payroll taxes 
may also have to be used to avoid the need for movements in wages that could also be hard to put in 
place, given the institutional and political conditions.
1  With a balanced growth rate of  1% γ = , a real interest rate of  3% r
∗ = , and a level of public debt () D  of
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where T  and G  stand for government revenue and expenditure, respectively, in order to pay for the debt.


























































IIICorreia et al. (2011) show that there is a combination of all those taxes that leads to the same outcomes 
that could be achieved away from the zero bound, or, alternatively, in a world where prices and wages 
could be automatically adjusted without cost.
In this article, we are going to play the role of a policy maker unaware of the results in the literature. Our 
policy maker will use a model that lets him, or her, experiment alternative policies without social costs. 
The model was developed and estimated to resemble the actual economy, with the aim of answering 
questions close to the ones we are interested in answering here. It is a version of the Smets and Wouters 
(2003) model for the euro area, modiﬁ  ed to take into account the zero bound constraint on nominal 
interest rates. We proceed by trial and error, performing different policy experiments. We compare the 
effects of those policies to the efﬁ  cient ones, which would be the same ones that would be achieved in 
an economy without sticky prices or wages.
We are not alone with Correia et al. (2011) in proposing these kinds of policies as a way of overcoming 
the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates. Martin Feldstein proposed it for Japan back in 2003 
(see Feldstein, 2003). Robert Hall and Susan Woodward made similar proposals for the US. There are also 
sectorial or regional policies aimed at giving agents the incentive to anticipate consumption. As pointed 
out by Correia et al. (2011), the US Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) program and tax 
holidays at the regional level are examples of these policies.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Next we present a simple model where we illustrate 
the details of the general results in Correia et al. (2011). Then, we proceed to the policy experiments.
2.  A simple model
To illustrate the results in Correia et al. (2011) we ﬁ  rst use a model where there are no frictions in the 
adjustment of prices and wages. We show that it is possible to conduct ﬁ  scal policy at the zero bound 
on interest rates that achieves efﬁ  cient outcomes and that does not require prices and wages to respond 
to aggregate shocks. Since prices and wages do not have to move, the nominal rigidities, that are likely 
to be present, are not effective. With this kind of policy, the economy with sticky prices and wages 
behaves in the same efﬁ  cient way as the economy without price or wage stickiness that we are now 
going to describe.
The model is deterministic. There are no shocks, but there are still movements over time because 
productivity moves over time, government spending also moves, and there may also be movements 
in preference parameters. In the model, there is a representative household and a representative ﬁ  rm. 
There is also a government.











where  t ξ  is a time-varying preference parameter.
Government consumption  t G  is exogenous. The production technology is
() , tt ttt t CGI A F N K ++= (2)
where  t K  is capital and investment  t I  is such that










st A  is an aggregate productivity time-varying parameter and the production function has constant 
returns to scale.
The government ﬁ  nances public consumption with time varying taxes on consumption 
c
t τ , labour income 
n
t τ , capital income 
k
t τ , as well as a payroll tax paid by ﬁ  rms, 
p
t τ . We also allow for lump sum taxes,  t T .
The budget constraint of the households can be written as
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together with a no-Ponzi games condition.  1
h
t B +  are nominal bonds that cost 
1
1 t i +  and pay one unit 
of money in period  1 t + . 
t i  is the nominal interest rate,  t W  is the nominal wage and  t U  is the rental 
cost of capital.
The household that maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint must equate the marginal rate of 
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The ﬁ  rms are competitive. They take prices as given and maximize proﬁ  ts, so that the price of the good 


















t τ  is a payroll tax.
In a competitive equilibrium all these conditions must be satisﬁ  ed. In addition, the zero bound on nominal 
interest rates must also be veriﬁ  ed so that


























































What are the efﬁ  cient allocations in this economy? If we were to maximize the utility of the representative 
household taking into account only the resource constraints (2) and (3), the resulting efﬁ  cient allocation 
would be described by the following marginal conditions: the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure would be equal to the marginal productivity of labour, the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption today and tomorrow would be equal to the marginal productivity of 
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and
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We now need to show that this efﬁ  cient allocation can be achieved even if the nominal interest rate is 
zero, with prices and wages that remain constant, using ﬁ  scal policy.
Efﬁ  cient policy at the zero bound
Let the price level and the aggregate wage be constant,  t PP =  and  t WW = . In order for an efﬁ  cient 





























Ctt t Ct t t
t cc
tt















































Ctt t Ct t t k t
t cc
t tt









⎢⎥ =− + − ⎢⎥

















































+= , then it is possible to satisfy the 
efﬁ  ciency condition (9). This is possible because we allow for lump sum taxes that pay for government 
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(18)
There is always some capital income tax, that can respond to the consumption tax and eliminate the 
intertemporal distortion so that the efﬁ  ciency condition (10) is also satisﬁ  ed.
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If the nominal interest rate is zero,  0 t i = , there is still a path for consumption taxes that satisﬁ  es this 
condition. Given that the nominal interest rate is zero and the real interest rate could actually be nega-
tive, then there must be inﬂ  ation. Here we are imposing that producer prices are constant. Inﬂ  ation 
comes from consumption taxes that will have to increase so that the real interest rate is the efﬁ  cient one.
The labour income tax must then respond to the changes in the consumption tax to verify condition 
(12), and the payroll tax must also move to verify condition (14). Condition (15) will be satisﬁ  ed by a 
rental cost of capital, and, as we have already mentioned, condition (16) is satisﬁ  ed by a response of the 
capital income tax to the movements in the consumption tax.
Policy in normal times
In normal times, the nominal interest rate is positive. This is possible with constant prices and consump-











−  is positive. The efﬁ  cient allocation can then be 
implemented in a simpler way. It won’t be necessary to move consumption taxes or the capital income 
tax. The other two taxes, the labour income and the payroll tax, will still have to move in order to keep 
prices and wages stable in response to shocks.
Condition (13) will be satisﬁ  ed by a time varying interest rate. Since prices and wages do not move, the 
labour income tax will have to move to satisfy condition (12) and the payroll tax will have to move to 
satisfy condition (14).
Sticky prices and sticky wages
We have analysed a model where prices and wages are ﬂ  exible. How can we draw conclusions from 
this analysis that may be relevant in a world where, for many reasons, prices and wages may be slow 
to adjust? In the model, it was possible to use policy to achieve efﬁ  cient outcomes by stabilizing prices 

























































IIIThe economy with sticky prices and sticky wages behaves exactly like the one with ﬂ  exible prices and 
wages. If it is possible to achieve efﬁ  ciency under ﬂ  exible prices and wages, it is also possible to respond 
optimally to aggregate shocks when prices or wages are sticky.
3. Policy  experiments
In this section we use a New-Keynesian model very similar to the one in Smets and Wouters (2003) which 
is probably the most widespread framework used for policy analysis. It is considerably more complex 
than the one we used in the section above. Prices and wages are sticky and there is a number of other 
features that are useful to have it track the data better. We are going to use the model to perform various 
policy experiments. We proceed by trial and error as if we did not know what the optimal policy is. We 
do know it and describe it at the end of this section. Meanwhile we increase government spending, cut 
various taxes and possibly raise some as we lower others.
The model
In the simulations below, we use a closed economy model with a similar structure to that in Smets and 
Wouters (2003), enlarged to include several taxes and to explicitly take into account the zero bound on 
interest rates.3 To calibrate the model we mostly rely on the estimation results in Smets and Wouters (2003).
There are four agents in the economy, households, ﬁ  rms, a ﬁ  scal and a monetary authority. Households 
have preferences over ﬁ  nal consumption and leisure with external habit persistence in consumption.4 
Private and public consumption and investment are composite goods aggregating a continuum of differ-
entiated intermediate goods. Households’ labour is also differentiated. Labour used for production of 
each intermediate good is also a composite of the different varieties. Production of each intermediate 
good uses labour and capital, with variable capital utilization. The technology has constant returns to 
scale. There are also adjustment costs in investment.
Households set wages as in Calvo (1983), which means that in each period there is a constant and 
exogenous probability of being able to reoptimise wages. Households that cannot reoptimise partially 
adjust their wages according to past inﬂ  ation. Households own physical capital that they rent to ﬁ  rms. 
They can change their capital stock by investing in new capital and they also decide on the degree of 
utilisation of installed capital. Households own the ﬁ  rms, receive dividends and hold both state-contingent 
and noncontingent nominal bonds. The return on these noncontingent bonds is the policy rate of the 
central bank.
There is a continuum of ﬁ  rms each producing an intermediate good and one representative ﬁ  rm producing 
the ﬁ  nal good, which is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of intermediate goods. The ﬁ  nal 
good can be used for consumption (private or public) and investment purposes. The market for inter-
mediate goods is monopolistic competitive and the market for the ﬁ  nal good is perfectly competitive.
Intermediate good ﬁ  rms set prices as in Calvo (1983). The ﬁ  rms that cannot change prices partially 
update prices with previous period aggregate inﬂ  ation (as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005).
The government purchases the ﬁ  nal good, receives revenue from levying taxes and issues debt. We 
assume that households pay taxes on consumption purchases, wage income and capital income while 
ﬁ  rms pay payroll taxes.5 Finally, the monetary authority’s behaviour is assumed to be well described by a 
3  See Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion of these models.
4  External habit means that the habit formation depends on past aggregate consumption rather than the indi-
vidual consumer’s past consumption. This allows for hump shaped responses of consumption to different shocks 
which is a feature of the data.










sTaylor rule outside the zero bound. The interest rate reacts to inﬂ  ation deviations from target and output 
growth, and there is interest rate smoothing.6
3.1.  The great recession
To induce a recession we assume, as in Eggertsson (2009), that there is an exogenous change in house-
holds’ preferences that induces them to save more7 and therefore reduce consumption. We also assume 
that there is an exogenous increase in the cost of installing capital that depresses investment.
These shocks hit the economy in period one and then vanish slowly according to an autoregressive 
process. After around four years the shocks have basically died out. The combination of the two shocks 
implies a reduction of consumption of about 2 per cent and a 8 per cent contraction in investment in 
the ﬁ  rst year after the shock, of comparable order of magnitude to the 2009 contraction in euro area 
private consumption and investment.8
The shocks imply a fall in inﬂ  ation lasting for one year. Given the considerable contraction in economic 
activity, the nominal interest rate is cut, hitting the zero bound and remaining there for ﬁ  ve quarters. 
The fact that the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero implies that the central bank is prevented 
from providing further stimulus via the interest rate. As deﬂ  ation sets in, the real interest rate rises which 
contributes to deepening the recession.
3.2.  Fiscal policy I
As in Gomes et al. (2010) we simulate the scenario where the economy reaches the zero lower bound 
and consider different ﬁ  scal policies that may overcome its effects. The results are different depending 
on the particular policy.
We ﬁ  rst consider a persistent increase in government consumption and a persistent cut in the consump-
tion tax, the labour income tax, the tax on capital income, and the payroll tax, one at a time. The initial 
increase in government consumption is 2 per cent of steady-state output, and the initial reduction in 
each tax rate would reduce steady-state revenue also by 2 per cent of output. The spending and tax 
changes ﬁ  rst occur in the quarter when the recessionary shocks hit. Thereafter we assume a gradual 
return of the instruments to their long-run equilibrium levels.9 The policy changes are displayed in chart 
1 and the results of these simulations are summarised in chart 2.
We ﬁ  rst simulate an increase in government spending. The measure alleviates considerably the contraction 
in output but the fall in consumption and investment is not signiﬁ  cantly reduced. Thus an important part 
of the improvement in output is due to government consumption. This policy reduces the time spent at 
the zero bound as inﬂ  ation drops by less than in the no ﬁ  scal response case.
We then proceed by lowering taxes. The cut in the consumption tax is also successful in lessening the 
output contraction, but in this case the drop in consumption is much reduced. The fact that consumers 
know that the tax is lower today than in the future motivates them to anticipate consumption. The 
measure is the one that leads to the lowest drop in consumption but investment still drops considerably.
6  This rule is different from the one in Smets and Wouters (2003), where the interest rate reacts also to the out-
put gap, deﬁ  ned as deviations of actual output from the output that would prevail in a ﬂ  exible price and wage 
economy and also to changes in inﬂ  ation. We also take a lower degree of interest rate smoothing as this helps 
us in making the zero lower bound constraint binding.
7  Possibly because of increased uncertainty and higher precautionary savings.
8  Implicitly assuming policy did not react.

























































IIIThe remaining taxes don’t have a considerable impact on either consumption or investment and as such 
on output. The time spent at the zero bound is not signiﬁ  cantly reduced. In fact, the reduction of the 
payroll tax actually lengthens the period over which the zero bound constraint is binding (to 6 quarters). 
This is so because the reduction in this tax implies a signiﬁ  cant fall in ﬁ  rms’ marginal costs and therefore 
induces them to reduce prices. The resulting deﬂ  ationary effect is stronger than in the case of no ﬁ  scal 
response. Therefore, a monetary authority following a Taylor rule will want to cut interest rates more 
aggressively and as such hits the zero bound for a longer period.
3.3.  Fiscal policy II
The most successful of the above tax policies in countering the downturn in both output and consump-
tion is the change in the consumption tax. The reason is that it changes the intertemporal incentives for 
saving. But a cut in consumption taxes also has deﬂ  ationary implications. In fact wages can be lower 
and prices too. A higher labour income tax has the opposite effect on inﬂ  ation. We now experiment 
cutting the consumption tax and raising the labour income tax. This has another advantage: the scenarios 
described above imply either a decline in revenue or an increase in spending by the ﬁ  scal authority. We 
can design an experiment in such a way that the impact on the primary deﬁ  cit would be zero if applied 
to steady-state level.
We start by decreasing the consumption tax and increasing the labour income tax. We consider changes 
in the taxes that, if applied to the steady state levels, would not affect tax revenue. Because the policy 
is revenue neutral (at the steady state) we can increase the magnitude of the changes in both taxes. We 
therefore simulate a change that is twice as large as the ones described in the previous section, so the 
effect on steady-state revenue of each tax is equivalent to 4 per cent of output. The results (Chart 3) 
Chart 1
FISCAL SHOCKS EQUIVALENT TO 2 PER CENT OF GDP (EX-ANTE)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIIshow that this experiment has a positive impact on consumption that in the short run actually implies 
an expansion, but it also reduces investment relative to the “no ﬁ  scal response” scenario. The ﬁ  nal 
outcome in terms of output is a smaller contraction, which ends up being of a similar order of magni-
tude to the best scenario (in terms of output) of the single instrument policy increases, i.e., the increase 
in government spending. Inﬂ  ation shows a much smaller decline which, together with the impact on 
output, implies that the monetary authority cuts the interest rate by much less and so interest rates no 
longer hit the zero lower bound.
As mentioned, this revenue neutral policy is bad for investment, so in order to deal with this we could 
lower the capital income tax. But to keep this experiment revenue neutral at the steady state, we have 
to redesign the change in the consumption and income taxes. We started by reducing the consumption 
tax rate and increasing the labour income tax rate by the same amount. However, given that the labour 
income share in output is higher, but very close, to that of consumption, this gives us very little margin 
to decrease the capital income tax and so the end result is similar to the previous case when the capital 
income tax change is zero. It is actually hard to distinguish the two curves in chart 3.
From these experiments, we would conclude that, while revenue neutral tax policies can help reduce 
the recession and obtain a better outcome in terms of consumption, they cannot achieve large effects 
on investment. We now allow for temporary budget deﬁ  cits.
3.4.  Fiscal policy III
We maintain the previous policy of a decline in the consumption tax, matched by an increase in the labour 
income tax, so that the policy change would be revenue neutral in the steady state. On top of that, we 
lower the capital income tax by an amount equal to 6.4 per cent of steady state output. This obviously 
implies a sizable increase in the deﬁ  cit, but that is comparable to the ones observed during this crisis. 
This policy amounts to a reduction of around 8.3 p.p. in the consumption tax rate and an increase of 
7.9 p.p in the labour income tax rate, as well as a reduction to basically zero of the capital income tax 
rate. The results, depicted in chart 3 (corresponding to “lower change in capital income tax” case in the 
charts), show that this goes a long way in the right direction in offsetting the contraction in investment.
We proceed by further reducing the tax on capital taking the deﬁ  cit to very high levels. We keep the 
changes in the other two tax rates. We succeed in reducing the fall in investment (corresponding to 
the “higher change in capital income tax” case in the charts). The tax rate on capital income would be 
negative, meaning that investment would be subsidized. It should be noted that these measures seem 
to constitute an improvement relative to an increase in government spending, in particular regarding 
the effect on consumption.
3.5. Efﬁ  cient policy
In the experiments above we proceeded by trial and error. But we know, from Correia et al. (2011), that 
it is possible to use tax policy to achieve full efﬁ  ciency, overcoming the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates.
The changes in taxes in the model economy that would allow to overcome the zero bound and achieve 
the efﬁ  cient allocations, which would be the ones under ﬂ  exible prices and wages, are displayed in chart 
4. To achieve the efﬁ  cient allocation, the consumption tax would have to be increased over time in order 
to generate (after-tax) consumer price inﬂ  ation.10 But increasing taxes tomorrow relative to today distorts 
10 It should be noted that we chose to start the simulations from the steady state. An alternative implementation 
would have the consumption tax rate fall on impact and increase back to the steady state, as in the simulations 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IIIthe allocation of labour and capital, so that labour income taxes would have to be lowered accordingly 
and the tax on capital would also have to be cut. As we could suspect from the results in the previous 
section, the decline in the capital income tax rate would still have to be sizeable (from 20 per cent in 
steady state to around 4 per cent in the quarter when it reaches its lower level) but now more manage-
able. Finally the payroll tax paid by ﬁ  rms would have to marginally adjust to avoid movements in prices.
The response of the economy under ﬂ  exible prices and wages is displayed in chart 3. As mentioned 
before, the revenue neutral experiments go in the right direction and as such put the economy closer to 
the efﬁ  cient allocation except in the case of investment. In the case of ﬂ  exible prices and wages invest-
ment declines by much less and consumption actually increases in the ﬁ  rst periods. Output falls less than 
in all the other simulations. In order to also achieve a response of investment that is much closer to the 
efﬁ  cient one, the reduction in the capital income tax would have to be extremely large and therefore 
the negative impact on the primary budget is sizeable.
4. Final  remarks
In this article, we have illustrated how the recent ﬁ  ndings in Correia et al. (2011) can be used to guide 
ﬁ  scal policy responses to a major recession that leads the economy to the zero lower bound on interest 
rates. We show that arbitrary ﬁ  scal policy leads to results that are far away from the efﬁ  cient allocation 
and that, given the model used and the shocks hitting the economy, the required changes in taxes are 
conceivable in a crisis period. However, the changes in taxes are sensitive to the speciﬁ  c shock hitting the 
economy (as is optimal monetary policy away from the zero bound) and there is a temporary deteriora-
tion of the government budget balance.
Chart 4
OPTIMAL RESPONSE OF TAXES
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